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Background 
This paper estimates the costs and benefits of investing in education interventions and 
specific child marriage programs to reduce child marriage in India. Child marriage in 
India remains highly prevalent despite considerable progress in the last decade or more, 
associated, in particular, with a decline in poverty. The economic consequences of the 
COVID 19 pandemic are likely to reverse these gains, meaning that the interventions to 
reduce child marriage evaluated in this paper assume even greater importance. 
Methods 
A literature search to identify interventions with costs and estimates of impact on 
reduction in child marriage for India, and other low and middle income countries was 
conducted. The costs and effectiveness of the interventions were modelled for India, and 
economic benefits of reducing school dropout rates and increasing secondary school 
completions were estimated. The ratio of the economic benefits to the intervention costs 
estimated gave the benefit-cost ratio. 
Results 
The interventions resulted in an average benefit-cost ratio of 16.8. The interventions are 
projected to decrease the estimated marriage rate for girls aged 15–17 years for India 
from an estimated rate of 16.4% in 2020 by 7.5 percentage points by 2050, with education 
interventions targeting increased attendance being the larger factor. By 2030, the 
proportion of girls completing school is estimated to increase by 13 percentage points and 
productivity to have increased by 16.4%. 
Conclusions 
The results indicate substantial economic and social gains to reducing child marriage by 
interventions that decrease school dropout rates, increase secondary school completions 
for girls, and address some of the broader social and cultural disadvantages they face in 
India. This has significant implications not only for their health, but also for the quality of 
the available economic opportunities and the possibility of attaining Sustainable 
Development Goal 5. 
Child marriage (CM) is defined as a legal or customary 
union that occurs before the age of 18. In India, the min-
imum legal age of marriage is 18 for girls and 21 for boys. 
The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 has closed loop-
holes which allowed CM and has made it a punishable of-
fence.1 India is party to a range of international conven-
tions outlawing child marriages, including several UN 
human rights conventions including the Convention on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Reg-
istration of Marriages (1962). The accepted measure of the 
prevalence of CM is the proportion of women aged 20–24 
who were married prior to 18.2 This is generally higher than 
the proportion of girls aged 18 or under, married at a partic-
ular point in time, due to underreporting for girls below the 
legal age of marriage.3 
In part, because of its size and high prevalence in a num-
ber of poorer states, India, in spite of the laws, has the 
highest number of child marriages in the world, about 1.5 
million each year.4 However, CM in India has fallen signifi-
cantly from 47% in 2005–06 to 27% in 2015–16.5–7 The de-
cline in CM is closely associated with improvements in girls’ 
education, transition of households to an improved stan-
dard of living and a decrease in average household size.8,9 
Some of the decline may also be due to the number of inter-
ventions and government programs, even though few have 
been appropriately evaluated. The serious economic impact 
of the COVID 19 pandemic on India is likely to reverse these 
favourable trends in child marriage. 
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While a complex range of factors contribute to the con-
tinuing practice of CM, the most important are: 
There are significant differences in CM rates between 
the Indian states. As indicated, the reasons are complex, 
but a number, such as poverty and educational outcomes, 
are reflected in gross state product (GSP). Figure 1 shows 
the strong association between CM prevalence and GSP per 
capita in Indian states. 
The theory of change16,17 on which our modelling 
framework is based, is that girls at risk of marriage benefit 
from improved educational and economic opportunities as 
alternatives to CM. The economic benefits of reduced CM 
arise from more productive employment opportunities be-
cause of improved education outcomes. The interventions 
to improve education outcomes are those designed to keep 
girls at school, reduce the dropout rate and extend the time 
at school to at least secondary school completion. These 
have the effect of delaying CM. Other interventions are 
aimed directly at reducing CM. By delaying marriage, these 
interventions help keep girls at school. These relationships 
are illustrated in Figure 2. 
The aims of this paper are to identify the most effective 
interventions to reduce child marriage, to estimate their 
cost and impact for the case of India, and, using existing 
models18–20, to estimate the benefit-cost ratio for their ap-
plication to India and their potential impact on CM. 
METHODS 
INTERVENTIONS 
Of the interventions considered, three have direct impacts 
on CM rates, while four have indirect impacts through the 
effect of educational interventions on school attendance, 
and hence on CM rates (Figure 2). We estimate the impact 
of reduced CM on educational outcomes, notably early 
dropout, years of schooling and completion of secondary 
schooling. We also estimate the economic benefit of better 
educational outcomes (such as higher productivity and ac-
cess to better employment), leading to higher levels of gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita. The results are brought 
together in a cost-benefit analysis. 
Evidence of the costs and effectiveness of specific CM in-
terventions was sought through a literature search of peer 
reviewed articles and grey literature (see Figure 3). The 
peer-reviewed literature search for articles is an extension 
of the search conducted in Rasmussen et al.21 Web of Sci-
ence and PubMed were searched from 2006 to 2020 (English 
articles only). The terms were varied, with the initial search 
(child marriage OR girl marriage OR early marriage) and 
Figure 1. Association between child marriage 
prevalence and GSP per capita, Indian states, 2016. 
(reduc* OR prevent*) resulting in 1456 articles in Web of 
Science, and 2012 articles in PubMed. These results were 
refined to (impact* OR intervention* OR trial* OR evalua-
tion*) resulting in 562 articles in Web of Science and 777 in 
PubMed, totaling 1339 articles. The two sets were combined 
in Endnote (Clarivate Analytics, version x9.3), and 370 du-
plicates were removed, leaving 949 articles. The titles and 
abstracts of these were reviewed and 21 full-text articles 
were chosen for the assessment. 
A grey literature search for non peer-reviewed literature 
and relevant reports was conducted in Google Scholar, uni-
versity library catalogs, and websites of relevant agencies, 
in particular international agencies (e.g. World Bank, 
UNICEF, UNFPA, Population Council) and research centers. 
We specifically sought evidence from the Indian sub-conti-
nent. Fifty-five reports were downloaded and investigated 
for intervention results or impact. 
Citations in relevant peer-reviewed journal articles and 
grey literature were hand searched for further relevant lit-
erature. A final set of 3 journal articles and 16 reports were 
selected for consideration in the modeling because of their 
relevance to interventions and impact on child marriage 
(see Table 1). 
Malhotra et al.13 identified five main effective strategies 
that included: life skills, community mobilisation, educa-
tion incentives, conditional economic incentives and legal 
framework. Kalamar et al.22 ranked interventions according 
to their detail, rigor, design and included impact measure-
ment, randomization, and pre and post comparisons. From 
Table 1, we selected intervention studies, with a preference 
for those from India, that included cost and effectiveness 
estimates and which met Kalamar et al.'s22 criteria and con-
formed to Malhotra et al.'s13 framework. Where there were 
no available data for India, and where possible, we drew on 
evidence from studies conducted in other countries. A more 
recent review of interventions by Malhotra and Elnakib,23 
broadly confirmed the selection of interventions used in 
this study. This included life skills training, conditional as-
set transfers to delay marriage, supply-side education inter-
ventions and the creation of female-focused employment 
• poverty,2,10 the average CM rate is 63% in the lowest 
quintile, whereas it is 10% in the highest. In Jumui in 
Bihar, the CM rate is 81% in the lowest quintile;11 
• social and cultural norms,2,9,12–14 such as the prac-
tice of dowry;9 and 
• truncated educational opportunities,9,11,15 girls dis-
continue education after marriage, mainly due to 
pressure from community, lack of permission from in-
laws, and increasing household responsibilities and 
financial burden.15 
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Figure 2. Modelling framework, estimating the benefit-cost ratios for the interventions to reduce child 
marriage. 
Figure 3. Literature search strategy for interventions on reducing child marriage. 
opportunities. 
Discussed below are the specific CM and the education 
interventions used in the modelling. The CM interventions 
used in the modelling included only life skills and condi-
tional economic incentives. We considered modelling the 
interventions for community mobilisation24 as suggested 
by Malhotra et al.,13 however, that indicated a low level of 
effectiveness, and accordingly was not included in the mod-
elling. 
SPECIFIC CHILD MARRIAGE INTERVENTIONS 
The 'Life Skills’ programs were represented by the Maha-
rashtra program25,26 and the Youth Information Centres 
program27 in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Based on these two 
programs, we adopted an effectiveness rate of 40%. A 70% 
reduction in the marriage rate was achieved by the Maha-
rashtra Life Skills program with an odds ratio of 4.0,26 al-
though the likelihood of selection bias in these comparisons 
and other unobserved variables is acknowledged. Exposure 
to the Youth Information Centres program27 reduced CM 
compared with the control group by 56% (Adj. OR 2.25, CI 
1.28–3.94). 
For the cost of the life skills program, we used the aver-
age of the highly effective but relatively expensive Egyptian 
Ishraq program of $31.50 per girl, and the much cheaper but 
less effective life skills component of the Indian Deepshika 
program,4 about $4–6.50 per girl, which resulted in an av-
erage of $21.50 per girl. 
For the conditional economic incentive interventions, we 
used the costs and effectiveness of the Kanyashree Prakalpa 
program,28 the only one evaluated in India, at a cost of 
$11.55 per girl and a effectiveness of 32.9%. 
Evaluating interventions to reduce child marriage in India
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Targeting Main intervention 
components 
Costs Method Impact/Outcomes 
India 
Pande et al. 
(2006),25 Pande et 
al. (n.d.);26 Life skills 
course, rural; 
Maharashtra, India 
Girls aged 12–18 
not in school or 
working 
1-year life skills 
program as one-
hour sessions each 
weekday evening 
Logistic regression 
analysis of data 
collected from 
program & control 
(randomly selected) 
villages 
Steady decrease in proportion of marriage in girls 11–17 yrs between 1997 
& 2001 in intervention. No significant change in control. Randomly selected 
control 4 times more likely married before 18 than those on full program 
(pre-18 marriage rate only 9%). 
Jejeebhoy et al. 




program by CEDPA; 
Uttar Pradesh, India 
Unmarried 
adolescent girls 








Baseline surveys of 
all 13–17 yrs old 
unmarried girls in 
intervention & 
matched control site 
pre-intervention 
(1038 girls). Panel 
survey 9–15 months 
later. 
Percentage of girls preferring to delay marriage beyond adolescence 
increased from 48–55% to 62–75% at endline. 
Mehra et al. 
(2018);27 EU funded 
Youth Information 
Centres; Uttar 
Pradesh and Bihar, 
India 





sessions, focusing on 
SRH, early marriage 
and early pregnancy 
Cross-sectional 
(post-test study) 




selection of a sample 
of 10- and 24-year 
olds. 
Intervention strategy showed a significant decrease in number of CMs 
(Adjusted Odd Ratios (Adj) 2·25, CI 1·28–3·94), of early pregnancies (Adj 
3·00, CI 1·06–8·43) and increase in school retentions (Adj 2·96, CI 
2·02–4·34). 
CEDPA (2001);30 
BLP – Better Life 
Options Program, 
peri-urban slums; 
Delhi, rural Madhya 
Pradesh and rural 
Gujrat, India 




37% of BLP girls married after age 18 compared to 26% in control group. 
Control group girls 35% more likely to marry before age 18 compared to 












young people to 
marry and have 
children early 
960 villages with 10 
million people 
Young women who took part in the program got married 2·6 years later than 
those who did not and had first babies 1·5 years later. 
Daniel and Nanda 
(2012);32 PRACHAR 








young people to 
marry and have 
children early 
Interviews with 
random sample of 
307 females and 306 
males of participants 
and 306 females and 
306 males of 
Among intervention group, median age at marriage for females was 2·6 
years higher (22·0 vs. 19·4) and for males was 2·8 years higher (24 vs 21·3) 
than in the comparison group. Taking schooling and caste differences into 
account, the adjusted relative risk of marriage among females was 44% 
lower and among males 26% lower for those exposed to the intervention 
than among their comparison counterparts. 
Study; program; 
country 
Targeting Main intervention 
components 
Costs Method Impact/Outcomes 
comparable ages 
non-participants 
Raj et al. (2017);33 









interviews with girls 
aged 13–24 
Changed social norms with later marriage being more acceptable and 
improved gender equity. 
Nanda et al. (2014 
);34 ABAD – Apni 








for registering birth 
of girl; and on 
enrolment at school 
and saving bond for 
daughter 
redeemable if girl 
unmarried at 18 
Savings bond Rs 
2500 redeemable at 






Study found program did not affect probability of being ever-married or 
probability of CM at 18. but ICRW did find that beneficiaries were more 
likely to get married exactly at age 18. Positive effect on educational 
attainment. 
Nanda et al. 
(2016);35 ABAD – 
Apni Beti Apna Dhan 
(Our Daughter, Our 
Wealth); Haryana, 
India 




for registering birth 
of girl; and on 
enrolment at school 
and saving bond for 
daughter 
redeemable if girl 
unmarried at 18 
Savings bond Rs 
2500 redeemable at 










(control group), 2 
surveys 
Impact evaluation found beneficiary girls were significantly more likely to 
complete 8th grade than eligible non-beneficiary girls, but no impact on 
educational attainment at higher levels. More than 80% of the study 
population (including both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) had not 
married before age 18 (at the time of the second survey), suggesting a 
general societal shift in the age of marriage in Haryana. Of the girls who 
were married, no significant difference between beneficiary and non-
beneficiary girls on probability of marriage before 18 years. 
Sen & Dutta 
(2018);28 
Kanyashree 
Prakalpa (KP); West 
Bengal, India 




For unmarried girls 
aged 13–18 enrolled 
in an educational 
institution (KP1) 
annual grant Rs750 
and a onetime grant 
of Rs 25,000 on 
reaching age 18, 
providing both 
unmarried and at 
educ. inst. (KP2) 
Independent 
primary survey of 
1,050 households 
from six blocks in 
three districts of 
West Bengal 
Preliminary results: Dropout rate reduced by 20·6% points; marriage rate by 









resource centre – 
network of support 
Per participant cost 





girls. Results based 




workers – sample for 
endline covered 583 
girls in project and 
324 in comparison 
areas. 
Impact on gender knowledge and attitudes strongly evident within 
communities – several young women elected into local self-governance 
bodies, some heading their gram panchayats, now active at village level and 
active part family level decision making. Changes within families evident, 
especially attitudes towards girls. However reduction in number of CM 
(280) small compared with large program size. 
Other countries 
Zibani (2012)37 in Disadvantaged out- Life skills Life skills costs per Monitored & No results at time of study, but indicators developed & program scaled-up. 
Study; program; 
country 
Targeting Main intervention 
components 











girl $17·99 Admin. 
costs pro rata 





& control villages 
with no intervention 






adolescent girls in 4 
rural villages – 2 in 
Ishraq, 2 in control 
group 
Social norms Safe 
spaces 
Longitudinal surveys 
of girls aged 13–15 
Marriage rates at endline among non-participants in program villages higher 
than in control villages (22% vs 16%). Rate of 13–29 months participating 
12%, with full-time participants 5%. 











e.g. chickens or goat 





($US20) if girl 
unmarried at 18 
Baseline & endline (2 
years later) of 2 
villages with similar 
SES profiles – 1 
program & other 
control; Chi-square 
tests, proportional 
hazards models & 
logistic regressions 
Improvements in girls’ school enrolment, age at marriage, etc. Particularly 
for girls 10–14 in program rather than in control area, more likely to be in 
school (odds ratio, 3·0) & less likely to have ever been married (0·1). But, girls 










e.g. chickens or goat 
Full model costs in 
Ethiopia $44 per 
girl; in Tanzania 









Ethiopia: Education support, 94% less likely to get married at endline. 2 
chickens for every year unmarried, girls 15–17 yrs were 50% likely. Full 
model, girls aged 15–17 yrs, were two-thirds less likely to be married. 
Tanzania: With goats, girls 5–17 yrs, two thirds less likely to be married. Full 
model positive effect among both groups of girls. 
Erulkar et al. 
(2017);24 Berhane 
Hewan; Burkina 
Faso, Ethiopia & 
Tanzania 
Cross section of 
men, women 













base line & endline 
surveys of girls aged 
12–17 & parents of 
girls 
Ethiopia: among girls aged 15–17, with conditional asset transfer half the 
risk of being married at endline compared to baseline RR = 0·57 Tanzania: RR 
= 0·52 
Catino et al. 
(2012)42 in Sewall-







Life skills Safe 






project cycle to 
adjust project 
strategies, & 
evaluation to assess 
project effectiveness 
as measured against 
outcome indicators 
Core outcome indicators for beneficiaries during pilot: 
• Continuation of education 
• Delayed age at marriage & first birth 
• Retention of health & economic assets after program 
• Leadership & teaming capacity 
Table 2. Costs and outcomes model, reductions in child marriage rates for 15–17 year-olds, 
compared with base*, percentage points 
Year CM interventions only All interventions 
2030 –0.8% –6.1% 
2050 –1.2% –7.5% 
Note: *Base excludes trend decline. 
EDUCATION INTERVENTIONS 
Education interventions, which also reduced CM rates, were 
derived from a meta-analysis.20 It measured the impact of 
education interventions to reduce secondary school 
dropout rates in terms of standard deviations. Only those 
showing an effect size in excess of 0.1 standard deviations 
for either learning improvement or dropout reduction were 
selected. The evidence suggested those which had a signifi-
cant impact on CM20,43 were (with their standard deviations 
in brackets): 
The costs of the education interventions derived from 
Wils et al.20 are expressed as percentages of the base cost of 
Indian education programs. The costs are respectively 10%, 
5% and 10% for points 1, 2, and 3 above, and a negligible 
cost for point 4 above. 
MODELLING FRAMEWORK 
In line with the theory of change,16,17 we developed a sim-
ulation/modelling study, which aimed to synthesize the 
available evidence on CM in India. The basic methodologi-
cal approach followed our previous paper.21 
Two Microsoft Excel models were used to undertake the 
cost-benefit analysis: a cost and outcomes model which 
generated education costs and other education outcomes; 
and a benefits model which forecast economic benefits from 
employment, GDP levels and productivity gains. The mod-
elling compared two scenarios, a continuation of existing 
conditions described as ‘base scenario’, and an ‘intervention 
scenario’ which included the interventions discussed above. 
For the ‘base scenario’, the cost and outcomes model pro-
jected base education costs, as well as CM prevalence and 
education enrolments. The intervention scenario estimated 
the impact of the interventions on this base scenario from 
2020. The benefit-cost ratios are calculated on the basis that 
the annual cost of the interventions increases progressively 
to 2030, thereafter remaining constant to 2050. The bene-
fits are modelled to include productivity and employment 
gains until retirement for each age cohort. 
To estimate the CM prevalence for 2020, we projected the 
rate from the 2016 National Family and Health Survey. To 
estimate the marriage rate for those aged 15–17 in 2020, we 
used the declining trend in the estimated single-year mar-
riage rates from the Survey to project the rate for 2020. We 
estimated that the rate would have declined to 16.4% by 
2020. We used this as the starting CM rate for the benefit-
cost analysis. 
For the intervention scenario, the models were run with 
the addition of the interventions discussed above. With the 
cost model, new estimates of education costs, student en-
rolments and child marriage prevalence were calculated, 
and the benefits model generated new estimates of produc-
tivity gains, employment levels and GDP, based on the im-
proved education outcomes. The additional economic gains 
from the employment and productivity effects, arising from 
the interventions, were compared with the costs of the in-
terventions, to enable the benefit-cost ratios to be calcu-
lated.18,20,21,44 The sensitivity of the benefit-cost ratios to 
different intervention cost and effectiveness assumptions 
was tested by varying each by +/– 10%. 
These models made extensive use of international data 
sources: UNICEF,45 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), 
ILO, and the World Bank Development Indicators and Ed-
Stats database. Indian data came from the National Sample 
Survey (NSS), the Annual Status of Education Report and 
the District Information System for Education. 
RESULTS 
REDUCTION IN CHILD MARRIAGE RATES 
The application of all interventions reduced the marriage 
rate for those aged 15–17 from the base of 16.4% in 2020 by 
7.5 percentage points in 2050 (excluding any further trend 
decline), to 8.9% (Table 2). Much of the impact was esti-
mated to be achieved by 2030 with a reduction of 6.1 per-
centage points. The effect of the child marriage interven-
tions, however, was modest with reductions of only 0.8 and 
1.2 percentage points by 2030 and 2050 (Table 2). 
This shows that the education inventions have a greater 
effect on the CM rate than the specific marriage interven-
tions. However, we estimate that the net present value of 
costs to 2050 of the education interventions was six times 
larger, $243 billion, compared with $40 billion for the spe-
cific marriage interventions. 
Regrettably, the severe effect of COVID appears likely 
to interrupt the downward trend in poverty and CM in In-
dia.46,47 We estimate that the effect of COVID 19 in 
2020–21 will be to lift the estimated number of CMs by 
179,000, an increase of almost 3%. This is based on the de-
1. Increase provision of school in rural areas to give girls 
greater access to schools (S.D. 0.38 (ρ = 0.27)). 
2. Improve educational infrastructure, e.g. provision of 
girls’ latrines (SD = 0.12 (ρ = 0.0)). 
3. Pedagogical changes (SD = 0.13 (ρ = 0.004)). 
4. Private public partnerships (SD = 0.15 (ρ = 0.136)). 
Evaluating interventions to reduce child marriage in India
Journal of Global Health Reports 7
Table 3. Benefits model, education and productivity gains from specific child marriage and 
educational interventions for girls, percentage points (i) and % (ii) 
Total 
(i) Change in educational outcomes relative to the base case in 2030  




(ii) Productivity effect for 20–24 year old girls (change by 2030, %)  












Child marriage (CM) interventions 
Education interventions (CM only) 
Total 
Additional years of schooling effect 
Change in employment level and type 
Total 
Additional years of schooling effect 
Change in employment level and type 
Total 
Additional years of schooling effect 
Change in employment level and type 
Total 
cline of 9% in per capita income for India in 2020–21 com-
pared with a year earlier.48 Paul49 has shown that CM in-
creases by 0.3% for 1% increase in poverty, meaning that the 
marriage rate would increase by 2.7 percentage points, rep-
resenting an additional 155,000 CMs. In addition, the num-
ber of 15–17 year old girls who will now be poor (less than 
$2 per day), and a have a higher propensity to marry, is es-
timated to have increased from 6 million to 13.4 million. 
Based on our modelling, this is estimated to add a further 
22,000 to the number married. 
At this early stage, it is difficult to project the impact of 
COVID on the longer-term decline in CM in India and we 
have not attempted to do so. However, it would appear that 
a greater investment than modelled here will be required to 
achieve the level projected in this study. 
BETTER SCHOOLING OUTCOMES AND INCREASED 
PRODUCTIVITY 
Table 3 presents schooling and productivity effects for the 
education and specific CM interventions. The interventions 
increase the share of girls completing secondary education 
by 13.1 percentage points to 2030. The education interven-
tions had the larger effect, shifting completions by 11.6 per-
centage points compared with 2.0 for the marriage inter-
ventions. 
Improved schooling outcomes were assumed to increase 
productivity. It is assumed that each additional year of 
schooling provides an economic return by way of increased 
income, and secondary school completions increase the 
number of girls employed and the proportion engaged in 
formal employment.18 The immediate economic effect of 
increased schooling is negative because it withdraws girls 
from the workforce. This is later offset, as a higher pro-
portion of the cohort enters the workforce in more produc-
tive roles. Table 3 shows the productivity changes, for the 
two productivity effects and the two sets of interventions to 
2030. Overall, the productivity improvement for both sets of 
interventions is 16.4%, of which 14.8% is a result of the ed-
ucation interventions and 1.8% for the CM interventions. 
The change in employment type (increased formal em-
ployment) had a larger effect on productivity, than did the 
additional years of schooling. The change in employment 
level and type had a productivity effect of 10.5%, compared 
with 5.4% of the additional years of schooling effect. 
BENEFIT-COST RATIOS 
Our study calculated the benefit-cost ratios based on total 
employment benefits as a ratio of the total costs of the rele-
vant education interventions and the specific CM ones dis-
cussed above. The modelling assumed that coverage of the 
interventions is progressively increased to reach an 11.3% 
target level by 2030.20 Both costs and benefits are dis-
counted at 3%. 
Table 4 shows relevant benefit-cost ratios for four educa-
tion interventions and two specific CM interventions. The 
ratios for all interventions is 16.8, meaning that there are 
almost $17 in economic benefits for every dollar invested. 
This is very high. It would be lower if the benefits were to 
be evaluated over a more limited period. Including the ben-
efits to retirement age reflects the fact that the benefits of 
additional education are transformational and last for their 
working lifetime. The benefit-cost ratio is 13.1 for the ed-
Evaluating interventions to reduce child marriage in India
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Table 4. Benefit-cost ratios for the impact of education and child marriage interventions 
benefits 
Time period Benefit-cost ratio* 
All interventions Marriage only Education only 
Benefits to retirement age 16.8 21.0 13.1 
Note: *discount rate 3%. 
ucation interventions and 21.0 for the CM interventions. 
While productivity and schooling gains of the education in-
terventions are larger, so is their cost. 
The benefit-cost ratio remains high, 14.9, even when the 
intervention costs are increased by 10% and their effective-
ness reduced by 10%. It increases to 18.9 if more favourable 
assumptions are adopted, a 10% reduction in intervention 
costs and an increase of 10% in effectiveness. 
To explore the effect of regional differences, modelling 
was conducted for two states with contrasting economic cir-
cumstances, the relatively well-off Tamil Nadu and rela-
tively poor Madhya Pradesh, illustrated in Figure 1. While 
Tamil Nadu had a secondary completion rate for girls of 
79.4% in 2018, it was only 46.3% in Madhya Pradesh. How-
ever, by 2050, it was projected to increase by 32.3 percent-
age points for Madhya Pradesh to 79.1%, but only 11.1 per-
centage points to 90.6% for Tamil Nadu. While the 
benefit-cost ratios are the outcome of the interaction of 
many factors, there is a marked difference in the two ratios, 
14.8 for Madhya Pradesh and 9.0 for Tamil Nadu, indicating 
the benefit of this relative outperformance by the poorer 
state catching up with an already well-performing better-
endowed state. 
DISCUSSION 
As discussed, CM is the outcome of the complex interac-
tions of many factors which include poverty, level of edu-
cation, and social and cultural attitudes. While CM in India 
has on average declined sharply over the intercensal decade 
to 2016, progress has been very uneven between regions, 
rural and urban areas, income groups and education levels. 
This study indicates that ongoing interventions in educa-
tion, and social and cultural attitudes are still a highly valu-
able investment in continuing this reduction in CM with an 
overall benefit-cost ratio of 16.8, meaning that there are al-
most $17 in economic benefits for every dollar invested. 
In modelling the two sets of interventions separately, 
we show that the direct CM interventions deliver a higher 
benefit-cost ratio (21.0) than the education interventions 
(13.1). This is partly due to the relatively high costs of the 
education interventions compared with the CM ones. The 
cost of the education interventions range from $3,200 to 
$5,900 per girl, compared with the CM interventions which 
are in the range $12–$22 per girl. The education inter-
ventions which we modelled are all supply-side interven-
tions to make education more attractive (closer, more girl-
friendly schools with better-trained teachers). In contrast, 
the CM interventions increase demand by providing condi-
tional non-cash incentives to delay marriage and life skills 
programs to empower girls to remain unmarried and there-
fore to stay longer at school. 
While these results certainly support the expansion of 
CM intervention programs, they should not be undertaken 
at a cost to the education system, since the two are inter-
dependent. The benefits of the CM interventions arise be-
cause they allow girls to stay at school. Ultimately, a quality 
and accessible education system is fundamental to provid-
ing the skills and training necessary to generate very large 
economic benefits. As Malhotra and Elnakib argue, ‘the en-
hancement of girls’ own human capital and opportunities 
is the most compelling pathway to delaying marriage’.23(p1) 
Together, the two sets of interventions act to discourage 
girls from dropping out of school and continuing in their 
studies to complete secondary school. They deliver large 
benefits not only in improved productivity for every year 
of additional schooling, but also in the opportunity to find 
higher paid jobs in the formal sector.50–54 
In communities where girls are systematically excluded 
from participation in social, economic and political life, CM 
represents a serious human rights issue for individual girls. 
Delaying marriage and extending years at school have ben-
efits that go beyond enhanced employment opportunities 
and higher incomes. There are other benefits, such as re-
duced fertility and improved health outcomes, not included 
in this study.55 Together with the employment benefits, 
these benefits are transformational for communities with 
high levels of poverty. Better-educated women with smaller 
families are better placed to break the intergenerational 
cycle of early marriage, limited education and low in-
comes.56,57 
The context in which these interventions are being eval-
uated is undoubtedly important. Our analysis for the 
UNFPA showed that since 1990, trends in countries with 
high CM prevalence could be placed in three categories of 
almost equal size, as trending down, stuck after a downward 
shift or no change/increase.58(p91-113) The Indian context 
has been supportive to reducing CM and therefore is 
favourable to the effectiveness of our modelled interven-
tions. However, the impact of COVID is to cause a signifi-
cant retracement of poverty rates, making reductions in CM 
more difficult and stimulating the requirement for greater 
investment to continue the downward trend. Other coun-
tries which have demonstrated the effectiveness of these 
interventions, but which now face rising COVID-related 
poverty, may also find greater resistance to reductions in 
CM using these interventions and require increased invest-
ment in expanded programs to reduce CM.59 
Evaluating interventions to reduce child marriage in India
Journal of Global Health Reports 9
LIMITATIONS 
As with all modelling exercises, the results produced here 
depend on the assumptions made in specifying the relevant 
variables. Some causes of CM were not modelled. Moreover, 
the relationships between CM, education and employment 
outcomes are complex, and the direction of causation is of-
ten highly interdependent. It is not possible, given the lim-
ited evidence, to capture all these relationships. 
In deriving the effectiveness and cost parameters from 
the CM intervention literature, we acknowledge that we are 
adopting an experimental approach in which the outcomes 
with and without the interventions are compared.60 While 
there are weaknesses in such an approach, one strength is 
that we are able to test the cost effectiveness of interven-
tions based on the results of actual field experiments.60,61 
A limitation of the approach is that some relevant inter-
ventions may not have been formally evaluated and we are 
unable to include their impact in our modelling. Offsetting 
that limitation is that those deemed most important tend to 
be those that have been evaluated. 
Accordingly, the modelling attempts to incorporate the 
most important relationships based on the best under-
standing from the available evidence. Nonetheless, this 
analysis relies on a small number of studies, not all of them 
Indian. Furthermore, the results of these studies are broadly 
applied to contexts which may be very different from those 
where the results were produced. Even so, the benefit-cost 
ratios are very high permitting substantially higher costs or 
lower effectiveness in the implementation of the modelled 
interventions, without undermining the very advantageous 
economic outcomes from investing in reducing CM. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Modelling the impacts of education interventions and child 
marriage interventions on early marriage makes it possible 
to compare the value of the economic and social gains from 
reducing child marriage, with the costs of the interventions 
to do so. This study suggests that interventions that reduce 
child marriage through increased attendance at school and 
changing social attitudes to child marriage, are both so-
cially important and economically valuable. While the 
knowledge of impact and costs remain imperfect, the ben-
efit-cost ratios are robust for different intervention levels. 
The interventions generate economic and social benefits 
that are many times their costs, leaving a significant margin 
for error. While the COVID 19 pandemic has introduced new 
uncertainties into outcomes modelled in this paper, with 
the extent of the economic downturn yet to be realised, 
the pandemic can only have exacerbated the factors driving 
poor families to marry off their daughters. There is even 
more reason for the interventions identified in this paper to 
be implemented. 
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